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Now that the euro notes and coins have been in circula-
tion for over ﬁ  ve years, it seems a good time to analyse 
any effect which the euro has had on prices. Even today, 
the introduction of the euro (1) is often linked to price rises, 
whereas in reality inﬂ  ation measured by the harmonised 
index  of  consumer  prices  (HICP)  has  remained  moder-
ate since the changeover, especially in view of the fact 
that crude oil prices have risen very steeply in the past 
few years, something which has nothing to do with the 
euro. Surveys have shown that the fear of price rises was 
already present even before the introduction of the euro. 
In November 2001, 70 p.c. of consumers in the euro area 
were afraid of being adversely affected by the change-
over. In Belgium, the ﬁ  gure was 64 p.c. After the change-
over in 2002, over 80 p.c. of consumers in the euro area 
did in fact feel that they had been adversely affected by 
the switch, or that prices had often been rounded up. 
The  changeover  generated  a  similar  impression  among 
Belgian consumers. Even today, more than ﬁ  ve years after 
the introduction of the euro notes and coins, that feeling 
is still very persistent. At the end of 2006, the great major-
ity of the population, both in the euro area as a whole and 
in Belgium, were still convinced that the euro had undeni-
ably driven up prices. This subject recently became highly 
topical once again, particularly when Slovenia joined the 
euro area on 1 January 2007.
The changeover to the euro therefore seems to have sev-
ered the link between measured inﬂ  ation and perceived 
inﬂ  ation.  This  article  intends  to  examine  this  issue  in 
depth, looking at both the euro area and Belgium. Where 
more data are available for Belgium, the analysis is con-
ﬁ  ned to the Belgian economy.
The  article  is  arranged  as  follows.  First,  it  analyses  the 
movement  in  prices  over  the  ﬁ  ve  years  following  the 
changeover to the euro. Certain microeconomic aspects 
of the price adjustments are also examined, namely the 
trend in the frequency of the price changes, the switch 
to new attractive prices in euro and the impact of the 
changeover  on  the  diversity  of  prices  in  the  economy. 
These points are important because they show just how 
fundamental  are  the  implications  of  the  euro  change-
over. The second section analyses the trend in inﬂ  ation 
perceptions as indicated by the European Commission’s 
consumer survey, and shows that the switch to the euro 
actually severed the link between measured inﬂ  ation and 
perceived inﬂ  ation. It also considers a number of factors 
which may have contributed to the breaking of that link. 
The ﬁ  nal section presents the conclusions.
(1)  In this article, the introduction of the euro and  the changeover refer to the 
introduction of the euro notes and coins on 1 January 2002.
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1.    What has happened to prices ?
1.1    Inﬂ  ation has remained low but the dispersion 
of relative price movements has increased
In the ﬁ  ve years following the introduction of the euro, 
i.e. the period from 2002 to 2006, euro area inﬂ  ation 
averaged 2.2 p.c. Although this is relatively low in histori-
cal terms, inﬂ  ation slightly exceeded the 2 p.c. threshold 
characterising the deﬁ  nition of price stability in the euro 
area. This is due primarily to the fact that the energy com-
ponent, propelled by crude oil prices, made a substantial 
positive contribution to inﬂ  ation, especially in the period 
2004-2006.  The  underlying  trend  in  inﬂ  ation,  which 
excludes  the  prices  of  energy  and  unprocessed  food, 
slowed during the period, falling from 2.5 p.c. in 2002 
to 1.5 p.c. in 2006, mainly as a result of moderate wage 
growth and the euro’s appreciation. Nevertheless, the ini-
tial impact of these factors was masked to some extent, 
because underlying inﬂ  ation was pushed up by a series 
of administrative price changes, which were particularly 
marked in 2004. In 2007, this last factor again exerted 
considerable upward pressure following the increase in 
VAT in Germany.
In Belgium, inﬂ  ation followed much the same pattern as 
in the euro area over the same period, although the aver-
age rate was slightly lower at 2 p.c. compared to 2.2 p.c. 
in the euro area. Yet there are two major differences. First, 
inﬂ  ation in Belgium is more sensitive to crude oil price 
changes, both up and down, owing to the greater weight 
of petroleum products in the Belgian consumption basket, 
and  the  lower  level  of  excise  duty  on  those  products. 
Second, primarily administrative price changes essentially 
exerted downward pressure, as a result of the abolition of 
the radio and television licence fee in Flanders (2002) and 
Brussels (2003), and its reduction in Wallonia (2003), and 
the liberalisation of the network industries.
During the ﬁ  ve years following the introduction of the 
euro, inﬂ  ation remained low and was only a little higher 
than in the preceding ﬁ  ve years – averaging from 1.6 p.c. 
to 2.2 p.c. in the euro area –, but in contrast there was 
a substantial increase in the dispersion of relative price 
movements. The standard deviation of price changes for 
the various products, which is a measure of dispersion, in 
fact increased from 2.5 to 3.1 between the two periods in 
the euro area. In Belgium, the increase was actually even 
more marked, as the standard deviation went up from 2 
to 5.1. The interval of two times two standard deviations 













CHART  1  INFLATION
  (contribution of the various components, percentage points, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : EC, ECB, NBB.
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around the average – also known as the 95 p.c. conﬁ  -
dence interval, since it contains 95 p.c. of observations in 
the case of a normal distribution – therefore also increases 
signiﬁ  cantly. Both the number of products for which the 
price  has  risen  sharply  and  the  number  for  which  the 
price  has  fallen  sharply  displayed  an  upward  trend  in 
the past ﬁ  ve years compared to the period 1997-2001. 
That phenomenon is evident for both the euro area and 
Belgium, but also for countries outside the euro area such 
as Denmark. It can therefore be classed as a structural 
phenomenon which has nothing to do with the euro but 
can be attributed partly to the progressive globalisation, 
whose  impact  on  inﬂ  ation  primarily  takes  the  form  of 
changes in relative prices : higher prices for commodities 
(particularly crude oil) and lower prices for manufactured 
goods. Over the past ﬁ  ve years, there have indeed been 
more energy products among the goods recording sub-
stantial price increases, while ever larger price reductions 
are apparent for a growing number of high technology 
products. Apart from the impact of cheaper imports from 
the emerging economies, this situation also reﬂ  ects the 
rising productivity in those sectors and the fact that the 
prices of these products are being measured increasingly 
accurately,  i.e.  with  adjustments  for  quality  improve-
ments. These ﬁ  ndings may have an inﬂ  uence on inﬂ  ation 
perceptions  if  consumers  are  more  selective  in  dealing 
with information on price reductions than in the case of 
information on price rises, or if their perceptions tend to 
be based more on the observed movement in prices at 
sales outlets, i.e. before adjustment for quality changes 
(cf. also section 2 of this article).
CHART  2  DISPERSION OF RELATIVE PRICE MOVEMENTS
  (annual percentage changes)
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1.2    Inﬂ  ation in 2002 : impact of the euro 
changeover was limited, but concentrated in 
certain sectors
An  acceleration  in  inﬂ  ation  from  2.0  p.c.  in  December 
2001 to 2.6 p.c. in January 2002 is apparent in both the 
euro area and Belgium. However, it is largely attributable 
to a smaller negative contribution by the energy compo-
nent – that contribution had become negative following 
the fall in oil prices after 11 September 2001 – and a rapid 
acceleration in the rate of price increases for unprocessed 
food, especially fruit and vegetables, as a result of adverse 
weather conditions. The acceleration in inﬂ  ation caused 
by these factors cannot reasonably be attributed to the 
euro changeover.
Nonetheless,  that  does  not  prevent  numerous  studies 
from  concluding  that  the  euro  changeover  did  in  fact 
drive inﬂ  ation up in 2002. But all those studies also point 
out that this inﬂ  uence was relatively limited, since it was 
conﬁ  ned to a certain number of sectors. The European 
statistical institute (Eurostat, 2003) thus established that 
the inﬂ  ationary effect had been concentrated in the serv-
ice sector, whereas the impact on the general price level 
in 2002 was most likely between 0.12 and 0.29 percent-
age point. The national central banks of the Eurosystem 
conducted similar exercises and generally arrived at com-
parable orders of magnitude. For Belgium, the impact of 
the euro changeover on inﬂ  ation in 2002 was estimated 
at around 0.2 percentage point ; it was similarly concen-
trated in the service sector (Cornille, 2003). Even in the 
countries where the estimated impact was greatest – e.g. 
the Netherlands, where it was assessed at 0.6 percentage 
point (Folkertsma, 2002) – it is still limited overall in rela-
tion to the increase in perceived inﬂ  ation following the 
euro changeover (cf. section 2).
The  factors  often  cited  in  the  literature  to  explain  the 
price rises linked to the euro changeover are as follows : 
the lack of price transparency and competition in certain 
sectors (Dziuda and Mastrobuoni, 2006), the complexity 
of the conversion rates (Ehrmann, 2006) and the exist-
ence of price adjustment costs – also called menu costs, 
by analogy with the cost of amending restaurant menus 
– which, at the time of the euro changeover, led to a con-
centration of price changes which would otherwise have 
been spread over a longer period (Gaiotti and Lippi, 2004 ; 
Hobijn,  Ravenna  and  Tambalotti,  2006  and  Angeloni, 
Aucremanne and Ciccarelli, 2006).
Thus, on the basis of a representative sample of 50 prod-
ucts included in the HICP for various euro area countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Italy and Germany), which cover 60 p.c. 
of  the  euro  area,  Angeloni,  Aucremanne  and  Ciccarelli 
(2006) established that the frequency of price changes 
–  reﬂ  ecting  the  proportion  of  prices  changed  during  a 
given  month  –  generally  presents  a  fairly  ﬂ  at  proﬁ  le. 
Conversely, it was observed that, precisely during the euro 
changeover period – and especially in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 
2002 – the number of both increases and reductions in 
prices was considerably greater, albeit for a short period. 
The increase in price changes was accompanied by a slight 
fall in their average size as measured by the average per-
centage change of the prices actually adjusted during the 
month considered (1). That is compatible with the existence 
of ﬁ  xed costs associated with price changes, implying that 
prices are only adjusted when the beneﬁ  ts outweigh the 
costs involved. Price changes will therefore be relatively 
infrequent,  but  their  size  will  be  relatively  large.  The 
obligation to convert all prices to the new currency unit 
following the euro changeover implies the temporary dis-
appearance of the price adjustment costs associated with 
genuine  price  changes  (i.e.  changes  extending  beyond 
straightforward conversion). It is therefore logical to see a 
short-lived increase in the number of price changes and a 
reduction in their size.
The number of price changes observed for non-energy 
industrial  goods  displayed  a  relatively  symmetrical  pat-
tern in that the increase in the number of price increases 
more or less equalled the increase in the number of price 
reductions. However, the situation is different in the case 
of services, where the sudden though short-lived increase 
in the frequency of price changes at the time of the switch 
to the euro is not only far more marked than in the case 
of non-energy industrial goods, but is also highly asym-
metrical  in  that  especially  the  price  increases  were  far 
more numerous than usual. That is consistent with the 
studies of the euro’s impact on prices, which universally 
showed that the impact was concentrated mainly in the 
service sector. That is also the sector generating the most 
complaints about unjustiﬁ  ed price increases, originating 
both from the general public and from the media. But 
even in the case of services, it must be said that this was a 
temporary phenomenon ; following the euro changeover, 
price adjustment rapidly returned to normal.
(1)  It should be pointed out that these price changes between December 2001 
and January 2002 were duly calculated as all changes in excess of normal 
rounding off (to the second decimal place or euro cent), associated with a simple 
conversion of national currencies into euro. The increase in the number of price 
changes and the reduction in their size are therefore not the artiﬁ  cial result of 
normal rounding off.
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1.3    A structural change in pricing practices
Although the analyses presented above suggest that the 
changeover had only a minor impact on inﬂ  ation in 2002, 
that certainly does not mean that there has been no major 
structural change in pricing practices.
The modiﬁ  cation of pricing practices following the intro-
duction of the euro can be illustrated by the change in 
the proportion of prices ending in 0, 5, 9 and 98. There is 
empirical evidence, not only in Belgium but also in Europe 
and elsewhere, that these ﬁ  gures are used more often 
than others in the ﬁ  nal position, to create what are called 
“attractive prices” (1). Since the ﬁ  nal ﬁ  gure changes once 
prices are converted to euro, it is logical to expect prices 
to be progressively adjusted so that 0, 5 or 9 is again in 
the last position. Consequently, the change in the propor-
tion of attractive prices offers a measure of the degree to 
which prices have been adapted to their new scale. Since 
these data are not available for the other euro area coun-
tries, the analysis is conﬁ  ned in this case to Belgium.
In view of the change in the proportion of attractive prices 
in Belgian francs within a representative sample of prices 
charged in the economy – namely over 100,000 monthly 
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CHART 3  FREQUENCY AND SIZE OF PRICE CHANGES  (1)
  (percentages)
Source : Angeloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli (2006).
(1)  Weighted average for the following countries : Austria, Belgium, Italy and Germany, which together represent almost  60 p.c. of the euro area.
Services
Non-energy industrial goods
FREQUENCY OF PRICE INCREASES
SIZE OF PRICE INCREASES
SIZE OF PRICE REDUCTIONS
(absolute value)
FREQUENCY OF PRICE REDUCTIONS
(1)  Two reasons are normally given for the very widespread use of these ﬁ  gures. First, 
round ﬁ  gures which are easy to add up and make it easy to give change where 
required are said to make transactions simpler. This generally refers to prices 
ending in 0 or 5. The second reason often mentioned concerns the psychology of 
the customers who, taking no notice of the ﬁ  nal ﬁ  gure(s), are said to give 
the sellers an indirect incentive to maximise their proﬁ  t by using prices ending in 
9 or 99. In practice, prices ending in 98 are also considered to be psychological 
prices. Overall, prices ending in 0, 5 or 9 – to which must be added prices ending 
in 98 – are generally referred to as attractive prices.
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about 70 p.c. of the basket of products included in the 
index – it seems likely, as already pointed out in the past, 
that  the  adjustment  to  the  euro  had  already  begun  in 
mid  2001.  However,  the  percentage  of  prices  adjusted 
as a result of that was relatively small, since in January 
2002 the proportion of attractive prices in euro was only 
36 p.c., compared to 73 p.c. of prices in Belgian francs in 
the year 2000.
Price adjustment continued after the introduction of the 
euro. Initially, during the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve months of 2002, the 
adjustment  process  was  rapid  (the  share  of  attractive 
prices increasing by an average of 4 percentage points 
per month), but subsequently slowed down. In February 
2004, i.e. twenty-four months after the introduction of 
the  euro,  the  proportion  of  attractive  prices  was  twice 
as high as in January 2002, thus reaching 73 p.c., or a 
level similar to that prevailing in 2000 in Belgian francs. 
Twenty-nine  months  later,  in  June  2006,  the  propor-
tion  of  attractive  prices  totalled  81  p.c.,  a  level  which 
remained unchanged for the rest of 2006. The services 
and processed food components account for most of the 
difference compared to the situation in Belgian francs for 
the total proportion of attractive prices. These are also the 
two components where price adjustments were the most 
rapid.  Although  this  more  or  less  stable  level  is  higher 
than that prevailing in Belgian francs, it seems that the 
adjustment to attractive prices has now practically come 
to a halt. Nevertheless, the full adjustment process will 
have taken almost ﬁ  ve years.
Furthermore, the prices with the biggest increase in share 
are  those  ending  in  0,  which  represent  over  one-third 
of all euro prices. In euro, some of these correspond to 
prices  without  any  decimals,  which  are  often  used  for 
“high” prices. Prices ending in 5 are also more common, 
but to a lesser extent. Conversely, the proportion of prices 
ending in 9, like those ending in 98, is still below that 
seen for prices in Belgian francs. The growing number of 
prices ending in 0 is due mainly to non-energy industrial 
goods, at the expense of prices ending in 9. The increased 
prevalence of prices ending in 0 and 5 – over half of the 
prices recorded, compared to around 42 p.c. before the 
introduction of the euro – may also be connected with the 
issue of the use of 1 and 2 cent coins, although that does 
not explain the causality. It is probable that, while prices 
end in 0 or 5 to avoid their use, it is also the case that 
some people consider the 1 and 2 cent coins to be useless 
because the majority of prices end in 0 or 5.
Another  illustration  of  the  change  in  the  structures  of 
prices charged following the introduction of the euro is 
the difference in the degree of use of the range of avail-
able prices. In this connection, we look at the change in 
the number of prices used in Belgium, on the basis of 
the number of different prices in the database analysed, 
























CHART 4  PROPORTION OF ATTRACTIVE PRICES IN BELGIUM (1)
  (percentages)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Prices comprising three or four decimals are excluded from the analysis, 
as are prices comprising one or two decimals in Belgian francs, because they are 
considered to be little affected by the use of attractive prices.
Prices ending in 98
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CHART 5  NUMBER OF PRICES USED IN BELGIUM (1)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Prices comprising three or four decimals are excluded from the analysis, as are 
prices comprising one or two decimals in Belgian francs.
Total database
Prices over 25 euros
Prices under 25 euros
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number  of  different  prices  rose  from  around  3,500  in 
2000 to just under 7,000 from 2002, which means that 
almost twice as many different prices were recorded in 
the databank from 2002. That indicates that a consider-
able change took place in the price structure, a change 
to  which  consumers  have  had  to  become  gradually 
accustomed. However, the increase in the number of dif-
ferent prices is less than the rise in the number of possible 
prices, which was multiplied by around 2.5 at the time of 
the switch to the euro (1). One can therefore deduce that 
the degree of use of the range of available prices is less in 
euros than it was in Belgian francs.
That is particularly apparent in the case of prices under 
25 euros. Their number increased from just under 1,000 in 
2000 to just over 2,000 in 2002, or again roughly double. 
In Belgian francs, almost all prices between 1 and 1,000 
francs were used, whereas around 500 potential prices in 
euros are not used ; there are in fact 2,500 prices between 
0.01 and 25.00 euros. The same analysis, but conﬁ  ned to 
attractive prices below 25 euros, indicates that 100 p.c. 
of possible attractive prices in Belgian francs were used, 
compared to only 80 p.c. of available attractive prices in 
euros. However, the latter are more numerous and there-
fore more diverse than was the norm before 2002.
The  number  of  different  prices  also  presents  a  striking 
picture : from July 2001 there was a gradual increase, fol-
lowed in January 2002 by a strong surge, which clearly 
illustrates the regime shift represented by the switch to 
the euro, and similarly the scale of the potential effort 
which  consumers  have  to  make  to  adjust  to  this  new 
system. While the number of different prices is relatively 
stable in the case of prices under 25 euros, it starts to 
diminish slowly after the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2002 in the case 
of prices over 25 euros. This suggests that the adjustment 
continued  throughout  the  period,  but  the  stabilisation 
seen in 2006 nevertheless indicates that the very great 
majority  of  prices  were  gradually  adapted  to  the  new 
range of prices in euros.
Changes in the price structure following the introduction 
of the euro were also seen in other euro area countries ; 
however,  data  on  attractive  prices  are  rarely  available. 
In  Germany  (Hoffmann  and  Kurz-Kim,  2006),  the  euro 
changeover  reduced  the  number  of  prices  potentially 
available.  Nonetheless,  the  number  of  different  prices 
increased, but to a lesser extent than in Belgium so that 
the  proportion  of  attractive  prices  declined.  Moreover, 
these adjustments to the new price ranges  were  more 
rapid in Germany than in Belgium. In Austria (Glatzer and 
Rumler, 2007), the situation is more like that in Belgium 
in regard to the speed of price adjustments. Conversely, 
the proportion of attractive prices in mid 2006 is more 
or less the same as that seen in the years preceding the 
introduction of the euro. Moreover, there does not appear 
to be any divergence between the various types of attrac-
tive prices,  the  percentage  of  each  remaining  relatively 
stable.
Summarising this section, it is apparent that the generally 
limited impact of the introduction of the euro on inﬂ  ation 
in 2002 was concentrated in certain sectors. Since then, 
inﬂ  ation  has  remained  low  but  there  has  been  greater 
dispersion in the movement in relative prices, both in the 
euro area countries and in countries outside. At micro-
economic level, the process of price adjustment, which 
seems relatively slow, gave rise to a new attractive price 
structure and an increase in the number of prices used in 
the economy. The problems experienced by consumers in 
getting used to the euro are probably linked to such struc-
tural  changes.  These  observations  taken  together  also 
suggest that the process of adjusting prices to the euro is 
correctly reﬂ  ected in the data used to measure inﬂ  ation, 
so that the HICP is an accurate measure of inﬂ  ation even 
if consumers may see things differently.
2.    What has happened to perceived 
inﬂ  ation ?
This  section  of  the  article  analyses  the  movement  in 
perceived  inﬂ  ation  and  investigates  whether  the  euro 
changeover severed the link between inﬂ  ation and per-
ceived inﬂ  ation. Perceived inﬂ  ation is subjective, by deﬁ  -
nition, and reﬂ  ects how consumers themselves perceive 
or  observe  the  movement  in  prices.  Perceived  inﬂ  ation 
will therefore not depend solely on the actual inﬂ  ation 
picture, but also on the degree to which consumers are 
sensitive to price movements. That sensitivity may vary, 
both between individuals and over time. Perceived inﬂ  a-
tion cannot be observed directly and is therefore difﬁ  cult 
to measure.
2.1    Perceived inﬂ  ation according to the European 
Commission consumer survey
The  survey  conducted  by  the  European  Commission 
(EC),  which  questions  around  23,000  consumers  in 
the euro area every month – including about 1,600 in 
Belgium – contains a question which aims to ascertain 
the consumer’s opinion on how prices have moved in the 
past year. The actual question is : “How do you think that 
consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months ? 
They have A(1) risen a lot, A(2), risen moderately, A(3), 
(1)  Since there are 40 possible prices in Belgian francs between 1 and 40, compared 
to 100 in euros between 0.01 and 1.00 euro.
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risen slightly, A(4), stayed about the same, A(5), fallen, 
A(6) don’t know”. For each country i in period t, a balance 
of  opinions Bit  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between 
a weighted average of the percentage of persons who 
responded that prices have increased in the past twelve 
months  and  a  weighted  average  of  the  percentage  of 
persons who responded that prices have stayed the same 
or fallen. The weightings of the various possible responses 
are the same for all countries. The options “risen a lot” 
and  “fallen”  are  accorded  twice  the  weighting  of  the 
options “risen moderately” and “stayed the same”. The 
possible responses “risen slightly” and “don’t know” are 
not explicitly included in the balance of opinions, which is 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHART 6  INFLATION AND PERCEIVED INFLATION (1)
(percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1) Standardised balance of opinions obtained from the EC survey, with HICP inflation as the benchmark.
EURO AREA
EURO AREA AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND
FRANCE GERMANY IRELAND
ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN
DENMARK SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM
EU-15 COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE EURO AREA
GREECE
Inflation (HICP)
Perceived inflation with HICP inflation as the benchmark
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(1) = + it B it A (2)– it 0,5A (4)– it 0,5A (5) it A   (1)
The balance of opinions, which may vary between –100 
and 100, provides a qualitative indication of the direction 
in which consumers consider that inﬂ  ation has moved in 
the preceding year. However, that qualitative indicator can 
be converted by a relatively simple standardisation proce-
dure into a quantitative indicator of perceived inﬂ  ation 
(Aucremanne, Collin and Stragier, 2007). That indicator is 
therefore accorded the same average value and the same 
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   it corresponds to perceived inﬂ  ation quantiﬁ  ed for coun-
try i in period t.    i and S   i are respectively the average 
and  the  standard  deviation  of  HICP  inﬂ  ation,  while B  i 
and SBi are the corresponding statistics for the balance 
of opinions for country i. These averages and standard 
deviations are calculated over a reference period for which 
there is considered to be a stable relationship between 
measured  and  perceived  inﬂ  ation.  In  the  present  case, 
that is the period between January 1996 and December 
2001 which is regarded as neutral and which predates 
the changeover. The averages and standard deviations are 
speciﬁ  c to each country, as the general public’s sensitivity 
to inﬂ  ation may vary from one country to another (1). The 
data conversion formula thus explicitly takes account of 
differences in inﬂ  ation sensitivity.
2.2    Impact of the euro changeover on perceived 
inﬂ  ation (2)
If the calibrated measure of perceived inﬂ  ation is shown 
in  chart  form  alongside  HICP  inﬂ  ation  for  the  various 
euro area countries, it is apparent that the two more or 
less coincide during the reference period. Since the euro 
changeover in January 2002, however, these two series 
clearly  diverge.  While  HICP  inﬂ  ation  in  the  euro  area 
continued  to  hover  around  2  p.c.  between  2002  and 
2006,  perceived  inﬂ  ation  increased  very  sharply  during 
2002.  It  later  subsided,  though  without  reverting  to  a 
level corresponding to the relation between both variables 
prevailing during the reference period. On the basis of 
the quantitative indicator of perceived inﬂ  ation deﬁ  ned 
earlier, the perception gap in the euro area peaked at over 
2.5 percentage points at the beginning of 2003. Perceived 
inﬂ  ation subsequently declined steadily, becoming stable 
from the second quarter of 2004, although it was still 
around 0.8 percentage point above the level which the 
HICP inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gure for that period would have implied 
during the reference period.
While the link between inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation 
was broken in 2002 in all the euro area countries, there are 
nevertheless signiﬁ  cant mutual variations. In broad terms, 
three scenarios can be identiﬁ  ed. The perception gap was 
totally  eliminated  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  by 
the end of the period under review. It has recently nar-
rowed  signiﬁ  cantly  in  Ireland,  Italy  and  Portugal,  while 
in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece and Spain it 
has remained substantial so far. In a number of countries, 
including Belgium, the perception gap has even widened 
of late, because perceived inﬂ  ation did not mirror the fall 
in inﬂ  ation recorded in the autumn of 2006.
If  the  same  chart  analysis  is  conducted  for  Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are not mem-
bers of the euro area, we ﬁ  nd a close correlation between 
inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation, both before and after 
January 2002. This clearly indicates that it was indeed the 
introduction of the euro which caused the break in inﬂ  a-
tion perception in the euro area. In that regard, it is inter-
esting that, after the introduction of the euro in Slovenia 
on  1  January  2007,  perceived  inﬂ  ation  also  began  to 
diverge from HICP inﬂ  ation (see box 1).
(1)  Increased sensitivity in a particular country may be reﬂ  ected in an average value 
for the balance of opinions which is high relative to average inﬂ  ation (in that 
country, inﬂ  ation perception is greater on average) and/or a standard deviation 
for the balance of opinions which is high relative to that for inﬂ  ation (a change 
in inﬂ  ation of a given magnitude leads to a more pronounced change in inﬂ  ation 
perception).
(2)  Standardised balance of opinion from the EC survey, with HICP inﬂ  ation as the 
benchmark.
P
Box 1  –    Inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation following the introduction of the 
euro in Slovenia
On 11 July 2006, the Council of the European Union (EU) accepted Slovenia’s application to become the thirteenth 
member country of the euro area from 1 January 2007. Slovenia was thus the ﬁ  rst new Member State to change 
to the euro, which became legal tender there on 1 January 2007, replacing the Slovenian tolar.
4
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When the euro was introduced in Slovenia, several lessons were drawn from the experience of introducing the 
euro on 1 January 2002. Thus, well before the euro changeover, an intensive publicity campaign was launched, 
during which a non-technical information leaﬂ  et was distributed to the population. In addition, dual pricing was 
made compulsory from May 2006, and price monitoring teams were set up to check that the price conversion was 
applied correctly. Finally, it was decided that the period in which the euro and the tolar were both legal tender 
should be limited to two weeks.
According to a recent European Commission report (2007), the introduction of the euro in Slovenia can be classed 
as successful, partly thanks to the measures taken but also because the euro notes and coins were already in 
widespread use in the Slovenian economy before the launch. The price increases associated with the euro were 
moderate, and were concentrated in a few sectors. According to Eurostat calculations, the introduction of the 
euro had an impact of no more than 0.3 percentage point on inﬂ  ation, and according to the Slovenian Institute 
of Analysis and Macroeconomic Development (IMAD), that impact came to 0.24 percentage point (IMAD, 2007). 
These estimates are very similar to the 2002 ﬁ  ndings in the euro area.
Despite the detailed publicity campaign which preceded the introduction of the euro in Slovenia, the Slovenians 
were also very much afraid that prices would rise. An EC survey indicates that at the end of 2006, two-thirds of 
the Slovenian population feared that the introduction of the euro would lead to unfair pricing and cheating ; that 
percentage was comparable to that recorded in the euro area countries. In Slovenia, too, the switch to the euro 

















































































































Perceived inflation with HICP inflation as the benchmark
SLOVENIA
SOME OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH JOINED THE EU 
ON 1 MAY 2004 (2) 
INFLATION AND PERCEIVED INFLATION (1) IN SLOVENIA AND IN A NUMBER OF OTHER NEW MEMBER STATES (2)
(percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1)  Standardised balance of opinions obtained from the EC survey, with HICP inflation as the benchmark.
(2)  Owing to the limited availability of data, only Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic were included in the analysis (indicated by a dotted line in the chart) for the 
period between January 1996 and May 2001. From May 2001 the analysis was supplemented by data for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. However, 
for Malta the data available are insufficient, even after May 2001, to be included in the analysis.
4
REVUE ECO 2007-09 SEPT EN COMPLE16   16 REVUE ECO 2007-09 SEPT EN COMPLE16   16 5/09/07   11:29:38 5/09/07   11:29:38THE EURO, FIVE YEARS LATER : 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO PRICES ?
17
Slovenia differs from the other countries which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 in that a perception gap had already 
appeared there when the euro was introduced in the euro area countries ; that gap gradually diminished, but 
suddenly reappeared in January 2007 when the euro was actually introduced in Slovenia. One factor which may 
have encouraged this phenomenon was that the Slovenian economy had already been largely converted to the 
euro before the ofﬁ  cial launch in 2007.
Immediately after their accession, most of the countries which joined the EU in May 2004 experienced a short-
lived  surge  in  inﬂ  ation,  due  essentially  to  indirect  taxes  and  other  administrative  price  changes.  In  addition, 
integration into the EU’s common agricultural policy and the abolition of the remaining trade barriers triggered a 
substantial increase in food prices. This caused consumers in the majority of those countries to consider that the 
price increases were greater than those indicated by the ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gures. In other words, joining the EU 
created a perception gap, but it was less persistent than that seen in the euro area countries after the introduction 
of the single currency.
Box 2  –    Econometric testing of the emergence of a perception gap following 
the introduction of the euro
Numerous studies have analysed how the introduction of the euro inﬂ  uenced consumers’ perception of inﬂ  ation 
by showing charts comparing the EC balances of opinions and HICP inﬂ  ation. The majority of these studies 
are  conﬁ  ned  to  a  single  euro  area  country.  Conversely,  Aucremanne,  Collin  and  Stragier  (2007)  conduct  an 
econometric test for all euro area countries to ascertain whether the introduction of the euro caused a break in 
the link between inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation. The test used, which is based on the standardised balances of 
opinions mentioned above, can be broadly divided into two phases.
Before studying the existence of a break in the link between inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation, it is vital to check 
whether the quantiﬁ  ed measure of perceived inﬂ  ation tracks HICP inﬂ  ation during the reference period. For that 
purpose, it is sufﬁ  cient to examine whether the difference between the two – known as the “perception gap” – 
is stationary around a zero average value. In other words, if the standardised balances of opinions are to be 
actually valid as a quantiﬁ  ed measure of perceived inﬂ  ation, they must not deviate systematically in either direction 
from measured inﬂ  ation during the reference period, and any differences must be fairly short-lived.
4
Nonetheless,  the  chart  comparing  actual  inﬂ  ation  and 
perceived  inﬂ  ation  is  often  called  into  question  since 
a  comparison  is  being  made  between  two  different 
concepts,  namely  perceived  inﬂ  ation,  which  is  qualita-
tive,  and  a  quantitative  inﬂ  ation  rate  (cf.  in  particular 
Brachinger, 2006). However, the approach presented here 
– as described above – is based on explicit quantiﬁ  cation 
of the EC balance of opinions. Moreover, the economet-
ric  approach  used  by  Aucremanne,  Collin  and  Stragier 
(2007), presented in box 2, conﬁ  rms that inﬂ  ation and 
the quantiﬁ  cation of perceived inﬂ  ation were very closely 
linked during the reference period, both in the panel of 
euro area countries and in the control panel comprising 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden. While this 
relation was preserved in the control panel, it displayed 
a statistically signiﬁ  cant break in the panel of euro area 
countries as soon as the data relating to the period after 
the  euro  changeover  were  taken  into  account  in  the 
analysis. These results therefore fully conﬁ  rm the observa-
tions described earlier, which are based purely on a chart 
analysis and clearly indicate a break in the link between 
inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation in the euro area after the 
changeover.
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Finally, to examine whether the switch to the euro caused a break, that same stationarity test is repeated for 
periods to which one month is progressively added. The test period initially extending from January 1996 to 
December 2001 is thus increased recursively until eventually it covers the period from January 1996 to December 
2005. Here it should be pointed out that the conversion of the balances of opinions is based solely on the data 
relating to the reference period, including for the longer horizons. It is therefore assumed that the general public’s 
inﬂ  ation sensitivity has remained unchanged, so that any differences in sensitivity will ultimately be reﬂ  ected in 
deviations of perceived inﬂ  ation from its pattern during the reference period. If those deviations are substantial, 
the perception gap will no longer be a stationary variable and a break will occur in the link between inﬂ  ation 
and perceived inﬂ  ation. The sooner the break occurs after January 2002, the greater the probability that it is 
actually due to the euro changeover  (1). To highlight any role played by the changeover, exactly the same analysis 
is conducted for Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden. These countries form a control panel : in principle, 

























































FORMAL TEST FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A BREAK BETWEEN INFLATION AND PERCEIVED INFLATION
(probability of a break (1) )
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1)  The existence of a break results from non-rejection of the null hypothesis whereby the gap between inflation and inflation perception is non-stationary. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected if the probability is over 5 p.c.
(2)  The control panel consists of Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Euro area panel (national CPIs)
Euro area panel (HICP)
Control panel  
(2) (national CPIs)
Control panel  (2) (HICP)








(1)  However, it should be noted that this method cannot be expected to detect immediately a break caused by the changeover in January 2002. Instead, it will probably 
need a minimum number of data (like other statistical methods) before it can distinguish between a temporary gap and a structural break.
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Such stationarity tests can be conducted both for the euro area as a whole and for each country individually. 
However, in practice only eleven countries have been analysed, as the time series for Luxembourg is too short to 
be taken into account. The availability of data on the other countries is also fairly limited  (1), so that problems of 
statistical signiﬁ  cance might arise. If the samples are small, stationarity tests tend to give a false indication that 
the series is not stationary. That is why stationarity was also tested for a panel of euro area countries, instead of 
only for each country individually. That approach makes more efﬁ  cient use of the available data, alleviating the 
problems of statistical signiﬁ  cance. However, it does have one drawback : the resulting conclusions apply only to 
the whole of the panel considered, and not necessarily to each of the constituent countries.
What can we learn from the formal stationarity tests ? As expected, it was difﬁ  cult to show that the perception gap 
was stationary for the individual countries, even for the reference period. It was only for Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Portugal that the perception gap could be regarded as a stationary variable during the reference 
period. However, the panel analysis results undeniably tend towards stationarity, but if the test period is gradually 
extended (forward) it very soon becomes apparent that the perception gap is no longer a stationary variable. That 
is true of the gap between perception and HICP inﬂ  ation for the euro area panel as soon as data relating to the 
period beginning in May 2002 are taken into account. That result does not really depend on the use of the HICP 
as the measure of inﬂ  ation. The same conclusions can be drawn if this exercise is repeated using the national CPIs 
as the measure of inﬂ  ation. In the case of the control panel, similar tests show that, whatever the underlying data 
(HICP or national CPIs), the perception gap is a stationary variable during the reference period and remains so if 
data extending beyond 2002 are progressively taken into account.
In order to measure the accuracy of the method used, the same test was conducted by progressively extending the 
test period into the past. Thus, beginning with the reference period, the period examined will ultimately extend 
from June 1986 to December 2001. The robustness test on the method used could only be conducted for the 
national CPIs, since the HICP did not exist until recently. In principle, the perception gap is expected in that case 
to remain a stationary variable. If that is not so, that implies that the link between real and perceived inﬂ  ation has 
also been unstable in the past (and that it is therefore intrinsically unstable), so that no deﬁ  nite conclusions can be 
drawn from the instability which followed the changeover. This exercise shows that, for the euro area panel, the 
perception gap is stationary until data from before February 1990 are taken into account, i.e. after almost six years 
of observations have been added to the reference period. Instability is also evident on going even farther back into 
the past, albeit less marked than after 2002. The addition of pre-1987 data causes the probability of a break to 
fall again. This exercise therefore demonstrates that the instability seen in the period 1986-1995 (i.e. almost ten 
years) is less than that recorded over the period 2002-2005 (four years), which provides formal conﬁ  rmation that 
the perception gap after the euro changeover is unusually large and persistent.
These ﬁ  ndings are exactly what one might expect from a break in the link between real and perceived inﬂ  ation 
following the switch to the euro. They are also validated by alternative quantiﬁ  cation methods of the EC consumer 
survey results. These ﬁ  ndings therefore support the conclusions drawn earlier on the basis of straightforward chart 
analysis, but are based on an econometric approach and are therefore less subject to criticism.
Difﬁ  culties due to the new reference scale
A ﬁ  rst key factor is undeniably the difﬁ  culties that con-
sumers experience in getting used to the new reference 
scale.  The  analysis  of  the  price  adjustment  process  at 
microeconomic level shows that it had substantial implica-
tions (for example, it led to a large increase in the number 
2.3    Attempts to explain the perception gap
It is therefore beyond dispute that the changeover con-
tributed to the emergence of a persistent perception gap 
in the euro area. However, it is worth examining why this 
had  such  a  signiﬁ  cant  impact  on  inﬂ  ation  perceptions, 
and whether other factors may have played a role.
(1)  This analysis measures inﬂ  ation according to the HICP. As the inﬂ  ation rates calculated on the basis of that index are available only from 1996 onwards, the analysis 
is conﬁ  ned to the period since 1996.
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of different prices in the economy) and that it was a long 
drawn-out process. It is therefore not surprising that the 
adjustment process is also slow and difﬁ  cult for consum-
ers.  For  instance,  surveys  indicate  that  almost  half  the 
population  has  trouble  getting  used  to  the  euro.  That 
proportion did not start to decline until 2005, and then 
only  very  slowly.  In  addition,  many  people  still  convert 
prices into their old national currency. They are therefore 
actually comparing current prices with pre-2002 prices, 
and in so doing they cumulate the inﬂ  ation and get the 
impression that inﬂ  ation is very high. This automatically 
leads  to  persistence  in  the  perception  gap  (cf.  in  par-
ticular Dziuda and Mastrubuoni, 2006 and Stix, 2006). 
European Commission surveys show that, in 2006, over 
half  of  consumers  were  still  converting  prices  of  more 
expensive purchases into their old national currency, and 
one-third were also doing so in the case of minor pur-
chases. Moreover, they often use a simpliﬁ  ed conversion 
rate, which may represent an additional source of error 
(Ehrmann, 2006). Until such time as the new reference 
scale is ﬁ  rmly entrenched, inﬂ  ation perceptions may still 
be inﬂ  uenced by the introduction of the euro.
Role of socio-economic characteristics
It is therefore possible that the inﬂ  ation perceptions of 
the population groups for whom the adjustment process 
is slowest may be more signiﬁ  cantly affected than those 
of other groups. That could apply to the elderly, but also 
to women and people in low-income groups, since they 
are generally more sensitive to inﬂ  ation, probably because 
they are more vulnerable to it or because they are con-
fronted by it more often. The question whether the break 
in  the  link  between  inﬂ  ation  and  perceived  inﬂ  ation  is 
more marked among certain consumer categories can be 
answered by analysing the inﬂ  ation perceptions obtained 
from the EC consumer survey according to the consumers’ 
socio-economic characteristics. It is evident that there are 
in fact differences in inﬂ  ation perceptions. Persons with a 
higher standard of education, higher incomes and a corre-
sponding occupation (self-employed or clerical and ofﬁ  ce 
employees), working full time, belonging to the younger 
age groups and of the male gender have a lower inﬂ  a-
tion perception, on average, than those in lower income 
groups,  less  skilled,  manual  workers,  persons  working 
part time, the unemployed, the elderly and women.
However, it is apparent that these differences of percep-
tion tend to be permanent, and that they were only inﬂ  u-
enced to a small extent by the introduction of the euro in 
January 2002, even if, in the case of Belgium – in contrast 
to the other euro area countries – the difference between 
the perceptions of the lowest and highest income groups 
widened  somewhat  after  the  changeover  to  the  euro. 
The EC consumer survey data therefore indicate that, in 
2002, the inﬂ  ation perception of all groups increased to 
a similar extent, subsequently declining slowly but only 
partially. A more formal analysis based on stationarity tests 
also conﬁ  rms the existence of a relatively uniform break in 















































































































CHART 7  INFLATION AND INFLATION PERCEPTION FOR 
DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS IN BELGIUM










(percentage changes compared to the corresponding 
month of the previous year)
INFLATION PERCEPTION
(balance of opinions)
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The  differences  in  inﬂ  ation  perception  might  perhaps 
come  about  because  each  group  has  its  own  speciﬁ  c 
spending pattern which may, in principle, be subject to 
price movements that deviate up or down from overall 
inﬂ  ation.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  consump-
tion  structure  varies  considerably  according  to  income. 
Expenditure on food, housing and health care represents 
a high proportion of the budget of less well-off house-
holds. Conversely, prosperous households spend relatively 
more on clothing, transport and leisure. However, there 
is no ofﬁ  cial indicator of inﬂ  ation speciﬁ  c to the various 
classes of consumers in Belgium.
Nonetheless, since the household budget surveys used to 
structure the weightings of the consumer price index (CPI) 
distinguish between consumers according to their income 
group, it is possible to calculate CPIs speciﬁ  c to each of 
those groups. As an approximation, series were calculated 
by modifying the weightings used for the CPI (index with 
base 1996 and new index with base 2004) in line with 
the differences observed in the 2004 household budget 
survey  between  households  in  general  and  the  various 
classes of households. The calculations were performed at 
a fairly detailed level for 115 products or product groups. 
Since  there  is  no  price  survey  speciﬁ  c  to  each  income 
group, it was necessary to assume that the various groups 
are confronted by the same price movements for each 
individual product.
This  exercise  shows  that,  although  there  are  slight  dif-
ferences  in  inﬂ  ation  rates  between  the  various  income 
groups,  the  variations  are  fairly  minor  overall.  No  sig-
niﬁ  cant  systematic  difference  was  found  between  the 
various groups : inﬂ  ation is thus not systematically higher 
for low incomes than for high incomes. The conclusions 
obtained in regard to non-signiﬁ  cant differences between 
income groups are also conﬁ  rmed by Bodart and Hindrikx 
(2006). It is therefore not possible to see this factor as a 
valid explanation for the systematic divergence in inﬂ  a-
tion perceptions. Moreover, during the period following 
the introduction of the euro in January 2002, the inﬂ  a-
tion rate facing low income groups tended to be lower 
than overall inﬂ  ation, because at that time the downward 
effect of the declining oil prices had a greater impact on 
this population group for whom heating oil has a par-
ticularly high weighting. This factor also accounts for the 
positive divergence for this population group in 2005 and 
2006. The movements in the prices of a basket of goods 
and services speciﬁ  c to low income consumers therefore 
cannot explain why they tended to be acutely aware of 
inﬂ  ation in Belgium at the time of the euro changeover.
Naturally, the results presented here are only an approxi-
mation of the real indices per income group. One of the 
limitations is that, in using weightings which are ﬁ  xed in 
time (except for the switch to the new index in 2006), 
no account is taken of the possibility of substituting one 
product for another, e.g. if the price becomes too high. 
More accurate calculation of these indices, offering all the 
statistical guarantees, is well beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, and if it proved to be appropriate it should preferably 
be conducted by CPI experts at the NSI. Some countries 
have taken such calculations to a fairly advanced stage, 
with the aim of demonstrating that the overall consumer 
price index is entirely credible, even though the inﬂ  ation 
which affects one particular household may deviate to a 
greater or lesser extent from that overall index, according 
to the particular structure of the household’s expenditure. 
Thus,  the  INSEE  in  France  and  the  German  statistical 
institute  offer  on  their  respective  websites  a  personal 
inﬂ  ation calculator based on the speciﬁ  c characteristics of 
the budget of each household (to be entered) for twelve 
product categories (1).
A priori expectation that prices would rise
Another possible reason for the perception gap is that, 
before the introduction of the euro, many people believed 
that prices would increase sharply, and they apparently 
tend to consider that this expectation was borne out. This 
theory is hard to verify, but an experiment along those 
lines was conducted in Germany (Traut-Mattausch et al, 
2004). People were given different menus with prices in 
euros and in marks. They showed a systematic tendency 
to think that the euro prices were higher than they really 
were. Even where the menu prices had been converted 
correctly,  they  had  the  impression  that  the  euro  prices 
were higher.
Movement in the prices of frequently purchased goods and 
services
Some people also claim that the perception gap may be 
due to the fact that inﬂ  ation perceptions are based mainly 
on daily purchases, and that price increases are noticed 
more than price reductions. This theory was formalised 
by Brachinger (2005 and 2006). In principle, this factor is 
totally unconnected with the euro changeover, and may 
also cause a perception gap at other times. However, this 
factor can be assumed to have played a speciﬁ  c role at the 
time of the euro changeover, as numerous increases in the 
prices of frequently purchased goods and services were 
recorded at that period. They were not necessarily due 
to the changeover : for example, food prices rose sharply 
as a result of bad weather. However, as already stated, 
the switch to the euro caused an unusual concentration  (1)  See the corresponding websites : http ://www.insee.fr and http ://www.destatis.de.
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of price rises in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2002. Furthermore, 
those price rises concerned goods and services frequently 
purchased on their own and paid for in cash, so that they 
were particularly noticeable.
To  examine  this  question  in  more  detail,  an  index  of 
frequently purchased goods and services was calculated 
on the basis of a study previously conducted by the ECB 
(2003). It comprises the HICP components which can be 
considered to be frequently purchased : food, beverages, 
transport services, fuel, postal services, hotels, cafés and 



























































































































CHART 8  INFLATION AND INFLATION PERCEPTIONS (1) BASED ON FREQUENTLY PURCHASED GOODS AND SERVICES
  (percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of the previous year) 
Sources : EC, ECB, NBB.
(1)  Standardised balance of opinions obtained from the EC survey, with inflation in frequently purchased goods and services as the benchmark.
(2)  Food, beverages, transport services, fuel, postal services, hotels, cafés and hairdressers.
EURO AREA
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Inflation in frequently purchased goods and services (2)
Perceived inflation by reference to inflation in frequently purchased goods and services
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basket of goods used to calculate the HICP. On the basis 
of that index, the balances of opinions were converted in 
a manner similar to that described earlier.
When  this  measure  of  perceived  inﬂ  ation  is  compared 
with the inﬂ  ation data for this smaller basket of goods 
and  services,  most  of  the  previous  conclusions  remain 
valid.  While  they  are  relatively  close  together  for  the 
period  prior  to  January  2002,  these  two  series  diverge 
very widely in the various euro area member countries 
after the introduction of the euro. One more, perceived 
inﬂ  ation in the euro area increases until the beginning 
of 2003, then gradually declines and becomes stable at 
the beginning of 2004 at a level well above the inﬂ  a-
tion ﬁ  gure for frequently purchased goods and services, 
although below the level prevailing immediately after the 
switch to the euro. Owing in particular to the steep rise 
in  energy  prices,  which  also  explains  why  inﬂ  ation  for 
frequently purchased goods and services is much more 
volatile  than  overall  inﬂ  ation,  the  gap  was  practically 
eliminated at the end of 2005 and during much of 2006. 
Since  perceived  inﬂ  ation  did  not  mirror  the  decline  in 
energy prices, the gap widenes again to reach a level close 
to that recorded immediately after the switch to the euro. 
Differences between euro area countries are also appar-
ent here, and are comparable to those which had been 
seen previously for the link between overall inﬂ  ation and 
perceived inﬂ  ation. The stationarity tests similarly conﬁ  rm 
that, when this index of frequently purchased goods and 
services is used as the reference, a break occurs in the link 
between inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation after the switch 
to the euro. They also demonstrate that it was difﬁ  cult, 
even for the reference period, to ﬁ  nd a close link between 
perceived inﬂ  ation and this alternative measure of inﬂ  a-
tion (Aucremanne, Collin and Stragier, 2007).
This evidence suggests that the special attention which 
consumers pay to frequently purchased goods and serv-
ices  played  only  a  minimal  role  in  the  emergence  and 
persistence of a perception gap in the euro area. However, 
it must be said that this is only one part of Brachinger’s 
theory,  and  that  the  asymmetric  weighting  associated 
with price increases and reductions respectively was dis-
regarded here. That factor may be of some importance 
since, as already stated, the dispersion of relative price 
changes increased in the period 2002-2006. Owing to our 
empirical strategy, we were also unable to check whether 
the  euro  changeover  itself  encouraged  consumers  to 
pay more attention to frequently purchased goods and 
services. That could be so if the consumers’ difﬁ  culties in 
getting used to the new currency encouraged them to 
concentrate more than in the past on those purchases in 
order to collect and process information on prices.
Speciﬁ  c character of inﬂ  ation measured by the HICP
It is therefore apparent that the broad coverage of the 
HICP  (the  products  monitored  concern  the  whole  con-
sumption basket, and not just frequently purchased goods 
and services, and they reﬂ  ect the consumption habits of 
the  population  as  a  whole,  and  not  necessarily  those 
of speciﬁ  c groups) is not the real reason why perceived 
inﬂ  ation  diverged  after  the  euro  changeover.  However, 
that does not exclude the possibility that other aspects 
speciﬁ  c to the HICP may have played a role. Moreover, 
it  could  be  that  the  HICP  is  not  sufﬁ  ciently  familiar  as 
a measure of inﬂ  ation for the general public, or that it 
does not inspire sufﬁ  cient conﬁ  dence, possibly because 
the  HICP  was  introduced  recently  and  is  therefore  not 
yet sufﬁ  ciently ﬁ  rmly anchored, and because the national 
statistical  institutes  still  tend  to  centre  their  announce-
ments on the national consumer price index, considering 
the HICP as a secondary indicator. The latter is clearly the 
case in Belgium. Finally, the measure of perceived inﬂ  a-
tion used in this article is based on a question relating to 
the movement in consumer prices formulated in general 
terms, without explicit reference to any particular index 
or to the HICP.
It is therefore worth repeating the analysis by substitut-
ing the national CPI for the HICP as the reference index. 
However, that analysis leads to the same conclusions as 
those presented above. Thus, box 2 clearly indicates that 
the  link  between  national  CPI  inﬂ  ation  and  perceived 
inﬂ  ation is broken shortly after the introduction of the 
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CHART 9  INFLUENCE OF THE NON-INCLUSION OF COSTS OF
OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING IN THE HICP
Sources : EC, ECB, NBB.
(1)  No property prices are available for Portugal for 2005 ; for that country, the figure 
shown is an average up to 2004.
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One peculiarity of the HICP is that it does not include the 
costs of owner occupied housing, despite the fact that 
house purchase is by far the largest ﬁ  nancial transaction 
for any household, and has a major impact on purchas-
ing power. Furthermore, property prices in the majority 
of euro area countries have risen much faster than HICP 
inﬂ  ation, and the property price boom has received very 
widespread media coverage. It is therefore possible that 
this  phenomenon  may  have  had  some  inﬂ  uence  on 
consumers’ inﬂ  ation perceptions. Moreover, the average 
consumer is perhaps unaware that these costs are not 
included in the HICP ﬁ  gures.
To assess the impact of the non-inclusion of the costs of 
owner occupied housing, a direct comparison between 
the  size  of  the  perception  gap  and  the  movement  in 
property  prices  in  real  terms  was  made  for  all  euro 
area countries. Comparison over the period 2002-2005 
between the average perception gap and the movement 
in house prices revealed no evident link between the two. 
Since the average perception gap for that period is greatly 
inﬂ  uenced by the direct effect of the switch to the euro, it 
seemed worth checking whether it was possible to draw 
a parallel between the more persistent part of the percep-
tion gap (approached via the average perception gap in 
2005) and the property market developments. If Greece 
is  disregarded,  a  small  positive  link  is  apparent :  thus, 
strong price movements in the property sector tend to 
be accompanied by a fairly large perception gap in 2005. 
All the same, the correlation is rather weak. Even without 
Greece, it is only 30 p.c. and does not differ signiﬁ  cantly 
from zero.
However, this does not imply that there is no justiﬁ  cation 
for including owner occupied housing costs. That would 
extend the HICP’s coverage and would improve its compa-
rability between countries. Experts are currently examining 
the inclusion of owner occupied housing costs, but it has 
not yet been decided whether the HICP will incorporate 
these costs in the future. Moreover, there is no consensus 
so far on the methodology to be used if these costs are 
taken into account.
Another methodological aspect sometimes put forward 
to explain the perception gap is the fact that the HICP 
is adjusted for quality changes. As a result, the inﬂ  ation 
ﬁ  gure is somewhat lower than it would be on the basis 
of the prices recorded at sales outlets. However, adjust-
ments  for  quality  changes  are  nothing  new,  and  were 
already  used  in  the  HICP  before  2002.  It  is  therefore 
rather unlikely that they are the reason for the divergence 
between perceived and actual inﬂ  ation. The Belgian case 
provides some indication of the potential impact. Thus, 
both in 2004 and 2005 inﬂ  ation calculated according to 
the national CPI, which at that time was not adjusted for 
quality, was 0.2 percentage point above HICP inﬂ  ation. 
These differences are not negligible, but they are none-
theless relatively minor in relation to the total size of the 
perception gap recorded after 2002.
Overall, the speciﬁ  c characteristics of inﬂ  ation measured 
by the HICP do not appear to have played a signiﬁ  cant 
role in the emergence of the perception gap in the euro 
area.  The  fact  that  the  accuracy  and  credibility  of  the 
HICP per se are not in doubt is reassuring from the point 
of view of monetary policy, taking account of the HICP’s 
central role in the strategy.
Finally, it is sometimes also suggested that the inﬂ  ation 
concept  used  by  survey  participants  might  be  broader 
than just the movement in prices. For example, it is pos-
sible that the rise in perceived inﬂ  ation since 2002 in fact 
reﬂ  ects the rather pessimistic view of people’s disposable 
income, their personal ﬁ  nancial situation or the economic 
situation in general, rather than the actual price move-
ments (Del Giovane, Lippi and Sabbatini, 2005, and ECB, 
2007).
Conclusion
The analysis clearly demonstrated that the euro change-
over in January 2002 led to a severing of the link between 
inﬂ  ation  and  perceived  inﬂ  ation  throughout  the  euro 
area. Nevertheless, inﬂ  ation itself remained relatively low 
during that period, certainly in view of the fact that it was 
undeniably driven upwards by the sharp rise in crude oil 
prices and the increases in direct taxes and administered 
prices. The direct impact of the euro changeover on inﬂ  a-
tion  in  2002  was  also  small,  but  was  concentrated  in 
certain less competitive sectors and was therefore fairly 
visible. The changeover’s role in the development of the 
persistent perception gap cannot be denied. In Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are outside the 
euro area, inﬂ  ation perceptions corresponded very closely 
to inﬂ  ation both before and after January 2002.
However, when it comes to ﬁ  nding more speciﬁ  c explana-
tory factors, it is difﬁ  cult to identify their exact contribu-
tions. The statement that consumers tend to form their 
perceptions on the basis of the movement in prices of 
frequently purchased items is not sufﬁ  cient to explain a 
persistent perception gap. The socioeconomic character-
istics of consumers did not play a dominant role either, 
while the inﬂ  uence of more psychological factors, such as 
the problems which consumers experience in incorporat-
ing the euro into their reference framework, is difﬁ  cult 
to assess.
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The speciﬁ  c character of the HICP inﬂ  ation measure does 
not appear to have played a signiﬁ  cant role in the emer-
gence of the perception gap in the euro area. A similar 
gap arises if the national CPIs are used as the reference 
instead of the HICP. The non-inclusion in the HICP of the 
costs of owner occupied housing was not a key factor 
either. The fact that the accuracy and credibility of the 
HICP per se are not at stake is reassuring from the point 
of view of monetary policy, considering the HICP’s central 
role in the strategy.
Despite its size and persistence, the perception gap seems 
to have had few if any macroeconomic consequences, in 
terms of either wage costs or consumption. One effect 
of the common monetary policy has been to ensure that 
inﬂ  ation expectations are ﬁ  rmly anchored at a level com-
patible with price stability.
The perception gap is therefore essentially a challenge for 
communication aimed at the general public. The bodies 
responsible for measuring inﬂ  ation, namely the national 
statistical  institutes  and  Eurostat,  have  a  primary  role 
here. The same applies, of course, to the central banks of 
the Eurosystem. Finally, it should be pointed out that the 
current experience in the euro area is not fundamentally 
different from what happened in the United Kingdom fol-
lowing the decimalisation of the pound sterling in 1971. 
There are indications that on that occasion, too, prices 
were perceived to have risen considerably, whereas the 
effect on actual inﬂ  ation was minimal (cf. Moore, 1973).
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